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Abstract
This article uses a well- received recent text— Hess and McAvoy’s The Political Classroom— to suggest 
that democratic citizenship education today has a social accountability problem. I locate this 
discussion in the context of a longstanding conflict between the critical thinking approach to 
democratic citizenship education, the approach typified by The Political Classroom, and the critical 
pedagogical approach, which has an equal but opposite problem, that of indoctrination. If 
democratic citizenship educators are truly interested in transforming the social order, I suggest, then 
we need to listen appreciatively, and respond thoughtfully, to critiques of the approach we favor. The 
article ends by outlining a possible way forward, by means of a concept I term “transformative 
criticality.” I suggest that such an approach to criticality is enacted in another well- received recent 
volume in the field, Stitzlein’s Teaching for Dissent.
Submit a response to this article
Submit online at democracyeducationjournal.org/home
Read responses to this article online
http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol24/iss2/1
The balcony of the Adams High School auditorium is filled with 
students, teachers, and administrators who are skipping lunch to watch 
the senior class legislate. Even the local mayor is in the audience. They 
are observing more than 200 seniors who are dressed in crisp shirts, 
dresses, and suits and ties. On the theater floor there is a hum of 
anticipation. . . . Students huddle in deep discussion; several are 
clutching prepared comments as they pace near one of two microphones 
standing in the aisles. Majority and minority leaders, and a bevy of 
more than 20 whips, are busily directing and organizing their peers. . . . 
On the stage, the Speaker of the House sits at a table reviewing the 
docket with the Sergeant at Arms. The bell rings, and with a loud bang, 
the speaker’s gavel signals that the session will resume. (p. 85)
This passage from Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) recent volume, The 
Political Classroom: Evidence and Ethics in Democratic Citizenship, 
paints a vivid, compelling picture of a legislative simulation at a 
school Hess and McAvoy have called Adams High. Here, students 
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deliberate controversial political issues, aiming to come to 
agreements about policy alternatives. By so doing, Hess and 
McAvoy argue, they learn to participate skillfully in the public 
sphere, supporting their views with informed reasons and listening 
generously to those with whom they disagree.
democracy & education, vol 24, no- 2  feature article 2
Adams High is a case, Hess and McAvoy (2015) contend, of 
“inclusive participation,” and yet a second passage from the same 
chapter draws a less inclusive picture. Amanda, a high- achieving 
student and one of the only Black students in her class, reported 
that, in response to her objections to a proposed ban on affirmative 
action, classmates told her, “We don’t want to hear your facts.” She 
reported feeling that her views “were often dismissed by her 
classmates” (p. 104). Despite this and other evidence that the 
legislative simulation may have been less inclusive than the authors 
claimed, Amanda’s experience receives less than a paragraph; 
meanwhile, the paragraphs immediately following repeats the 
volume’s common refrain: “Through the process of reasoning,” the 
authors maintain, “perspectives are broadened” (p. 104).
I use this episode from The Political Classroom, arguably one 
of the best recent works in the field, to point out that American 
democratic citizenship education today has a social accountability 
problem. That is, respected democratic citizenship educators— 
Hess and McAvoy included— have embraced classroom 
deliberation not only as “best practice,” but indeed as a cure for 
what ails our democracy. In this article, I argue that democratic 
citizenship educators’ faith in deliberation’s inclusive and socially 
transformative potential renders them inappropriately inattentive 
to the real challenges that social inequality poses to deliberative 
democracy.
I locate this discussion in the contenxt of a longstanding 
conflict between the critical thinking approach to democratic 
education— as typified by The Political Classroom, with its social 
accountability problem— and the critical pedagogical approach, 
which has an equal but opposite problem, that of indoctrination. In 
the latter part of the article, I propose a possible way forward, 
through a concept I term “transformative criticality.” To illustrate, I 
use another well- received recent volume in the field: Stitzlein’s 
(2014) hopeful and pragmatic book, Teaching for Dissent.
Before proceeding, I would like to put my cards on the table: I 
identify as a critical pedagogical scholar, in that I believe schools 
can and should prepare young people to participate skillfully in the 
struggle to bring about a more just world. Given my critical 
pedagogical commitments, and critical thinking’s status as “best 
practice,” this article concerns itself more with the widespread 
influence of critical thinking’s social accountability problem than 
with the more limited influence of critical pedagogy’s (admittedly 
often real) indoctrination problem. That said, if democratic 
citizenship educators truly want to transform the social order, we 
must listen and respond to critiques of our favored approaches. For 
me, this entails learning to read the critical thinkers generously and 
engage with their perspectives in ways that lend my own critical 
work greater capacity to be convincing. I hope this inquiry might 
avail the critical thinkers something similar: an ability to speak in 
ways that critical pedagogues like myself can hear and appreciate.
Critical Thinking: Characteristics and Limitations
Published nearly two decades ago, Burbules and Berk’s (1999) 
paper distinguishing critical thinking from critical pedagogy 
remains a useful tool for conceptualizing widely divergent uses of 
the term “critical” in educational research today. In this and the 
next section, I draw on Burbules and Berk’s framework to outline 
key characteristics of critical thinking and then of critical 
pedagogy. I explore how each orientation has been taken up by 
democratic citizenship educators and conclude each of the two 
sections by sketching the orientation’s limitations.
Those favoring critical thinking, Burbules and Berk (1999) 
explained, aim to produce young people who can make thoughtful, 
well- substantiated choices about their values and behavior. The 
critical thinking approach advocates giving and seeking reasons 
and evidence; from this perspective, social ills arise from 
“irrational, illogical, and unexamined living” (p. 46). While 
proponents disagree over the extent to which critical thinking 
ought to focus on morals or ideology (Johnson & Morris, 2010, p. 
79), in general they eschew an ideological orientation toward 
building a more just world in favor of a logical orientation toward 
producing thoughtful and reasonable people. In democratic 
citizenship education, I suggest, this aim elicits a pluralist 
conception of who is involved, a set of strategies dependent on 
political autonomy, and the cultivation of the disposition Burbules 
(1995) has labeled reasonableness.
For classroom deliberation to be high- quality— for it be 
effectively transformative— many citizenship educators who favor 
the critical thinking approach advocate pluralism (Johnson, 2016; 
Parker, 1996, 2003). They value difference and disagreement as 
desirable— not as problems to be avoided or suppressed. Pluralists 
view diversity “as a deliberative asset” because difference 
“motivates individuals to justify their proposals with appeals to 
justice” and “contributes to social knowledge” (Parker, 2003, p. 97; 
see also Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In other words, diversity 
allows more possibilities to be considered, and this renders justice 
a necessary criterion in decision- making. Pluralism benefits 
democracy, then, by preventing it from devolving into monolithic 
tyranny. From this perspective, tolerance is key: To take full 
advantage of the opportunities difference avails us, we must respect 
others’ rights to hold views we find objectionable.
Political autonomy— the “capacity to make un- coerced 
decisions” (Parker, 2014, p. 357)— is understood by critical thinking 
proponents to contribute to a democracy’s well- being. From this 
perspective, individuals must be free to choose the values and 
beliefs to which they ascribe, neither mindlessly adhering to the 
dominant view nor being forced or coerced into doing so. 
Politically autonomous citizens are able to articulate their own 
concepts of “the good life” (Gutmann, 1999) and to tolerate others’ 
views, even when these views compete with their own. Indeed, a 
liberal democracy requires citizens to be tolerant, independent 
critical thinkers, so schooling must aim not to indoctrinate them 
but instead— somewhat paradoxically— to “shape them into the 
kind of people who decide for themselves what shape they will 
take” (Parker, 2014, p. 353). Political autonomy and classroom 
deliberation are viewed, from this perspective, as mutually 
reinforcing: Young people need opportunities to participate in 
decision- making in order to develop their autonomy, and they 
need to develop their own values and beliefs in order to decide.
A central disposition of the critical thinking approach to 
democratic citizenship education is what Burbules (1995) has 
democracy & education, vol 24, no- 2  feature article 3
called reasonableness. In response to postmodern and feminist 
critiques of reason and rationality— the critique, for example, that 
“reason” privileges a Western, patriarchal worldview— Burbules 
proposed this more modest and contingent concept. For Burbules, 
reasonableness indicated “a practice growing out of communicative 
interactions in which the full play of human thought, feeling, and 
motivation operate” (p. 85). Whereas rationality tends to privilege 
logical deduction and a search for universal truths, reasonableness, 
in his view, arises from “practical, social” activities like speaking, 
listening, and reflection and may not be generalizable to all people. 
Reasonableness seeks an outcome to which participants, after 
careful deliberation, are willing to consent.
One of the critical pedagogues’ primary critiques of critical 
thinking is that it makes a false claim to ideological neutrality. 
Burbules and Berk (1999) explained that, according to the critical 
pedagogical view, deliberation is never neutral but rather arises 
from and therefore favors a Western, patriarchal worldview 
(Gaztambide- Fernández, 2012; Sanders, 1997). Burbules’s own 
(1995) more contingent definition of reasonableness 
notwithstanding, the critical pedagogues suggest deliberation 
cannot escape an intrinsic bias in favor of certain cultural 
perspectives at the expense of others. It places a Western, liberal 
humanist emphasis on the individual at the expense of the 
collective and masquerades as equitable while favoring dominant 
identities and ideologies.
Not only is deliberation biased, from this view, but so is the 
society in which we live: Through popular culture and media, and 
through schooling itself, our society cultivates conventional 
assumptions while suppressing other values and ways of seeing the 
world. As Burbules and Berk (1999) explained, from the critical 
pedagogical perspective, “indoctrination is the case already; 
students must be brought to criticality, and this can only be done by 
alerting them to the social conditions that have brought this about” 
(p. 55). The umbrella critique— the one Burbules and Berk endorsed 
as “the most challenging critique” of critical thinking— is that it 
fails to attend to people’s lived experience of inequality. “Critical 
Thinking needs to be questioned from the standpoint of social 
accountability,” they wrote. “It needs to be asked what difference it 
makes to people’s real lives” (p. 58).
Critical Pedagogy: Characteristics and Limitations
Whereas critical thinking focuses on the skillful use of reasons and 
evidence, remaining relatively agnostic as to content, critical 
pedagogy focuses on the hegemony of dominant ideologies and the 
resulting oppression of marginalized social groups (or those whom 
Spivak [1988] has termed “the subaltern”). Proponents “raise 
questions about inequalities of power, about the false myths of 
opportunity and merit for many students, and about the way belief 
systems become internalized” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 50). Rather 
than accepting the status quo, critical pedagogues hope learners and 
teachers together will develop what Freire (1970/2008) termed 
conscientizaçáo— often translated as “critical consciousness.” This 
attitude concerns itself with “social relations, social institutions, and 
social traditions that create and maintain conditions of oppression” 
(Burbules and Berk, 1999, p. 53). In democratic citizenship education, 
I want to suggest, critical pedagogy is characterized by a solidarity- 
based conception of who is involved, a strategy centered around 
social justice activism, and a disposition to critique.
Whereas the deliberative ideal favored by critical- thinking- 
oriented democratic citizenship educators values pluralism— the 
idea that difference is an asset to decision- making— critical 
pedagogical citizenship educators favor a broadened conception  
of difference, via the notion of solidarity. This is the idea that our 
differences may be balanced by our interdependence and shared 
human experience. Rorty (1989) argued that we must “extend our 
sense of ‘we’ to people whom we have previously thought of as 
‘they’” (p. 192). For Rorty, those of us who benefit from inequality 
can and should develop solidarity by attending to our common 
experiences of suffering— that is, by “increasing our sensitivity to 
the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, 
unfamiliar sorts of people” (p. xvi).1
Solidarity denotes a rejection or even reversal of hierarchies, 
undermining existing power dynamics by positioning the 
oppressed as agents and knowers, while positioning the 
oppression’s beneficiaries as allies rather than saviors. Freire 
(1970/2008) emphasized that a pedagogy of the oppressed must be 
“forged with, not for the oppressed.” His “radical . . . is not afraid to 
meet the people or enter into dialogue with them” and “does not 
consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people, 
or the liberator of the oppressed; but . . . does commit himself or 
herself, within history, to fight at their side” (p. 113). The definition 
of political solidarity I use in this article echoes Freire’s emphasis on 
the responsibilities of the oppressor. With their “political solidarity 
model of social change,” Subašić, Reynolds, and Turner (2008) have 
also advocated such a definition: According to this model, “the 
majority . . . come to embrace the minority’s cause as its own”  
(p. 331). Political solidarity, from this perspective, entails alliances 
among actors from divergent backgrounds— the privileged and the 
marginalized alike.
Whereas the critical thinking approach to democratic 
citizenship education values reasonableness, with its level- headed 
exchange of ideas, critical pedagogical scholars tend to favor a 
disposition toward critique that may become intemperate. They 
attend to inequality’s systemic nature, condemning the everyday 
social processes that hold inequality in place, and advocating for 
change. In contrast to the careful weighing of alternatives and 
tempered civility of the deliberative classroom, critical pedagogy 
maintains that emotions are intrinsic to criticality. Levine and 
Nierras’s (2007) interviews with sixty activists, for example, found a 
recurring emphasis on the “legitimate need to express anger, grief, 
and other powerful emotions” (p. 13). And Purpel (1999), noting 
1 As Rorty (1989) and Freire (1970/2008) have conceptualized it, 
solidarity is undertaken by those who benefit from inequality, in concert 
with those who are harmed by it. Of course, solidarity is and ought to be 
undertaken among marginalized groups, independent of their relation 
to the privileged (e.g., Gaztambide- Fernández, 2012; Mohanty, Russo, & 
Torres, 1991). In the context of public education, however, most teachers, 
administrators, and other decision- makers benefit from racial, economic, 
and other forms of privilege, and this article’s definition of solidarity takes 
that into account.
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that public education has “contributed to and colluded with . . . 
structured inequality, rationed dignity, rationalized privilege, and 
self- righteous hierarchy,” responded with “moral outrage at the 
unnecessary pain and suffering” such ideologies reproduce  
(pp. 188– 189). For critical pedagogues, like many justice- oriented 
activists today, powerful emotions are an appropriate— indeed, a 
reasonable— response to inequality and injustice.
Finally, while the critical thinking approach to democratic 
citizenship education values political autonomy— the idea that 
young people should decide for themselves what “shape they will 
take” — the critical pedagogical approach values committed social 
justice activism. Here, young people learn to build and take part in 
social movements and nonviolent direct action designed to 
challenge an unjust status quo (e.g., Kirshner, 2015). Critical 
pedagogues do not assume that deciding leads naturally to 
implementation; rather, students need to be taught to translate their 
political voice into political influence (Allen & Light, 2015). As 
Peterson (2014) has argued, “if we envision education for 
democracy as a means of developing in students a facility for 
actively participating in identifying and then opposing injustices in 
society, then we must move beyond teaching them to voice their 
objections” (p. 6). In addition to teaching young people to exchange 
reasons and agree on policies, Peterson claimed, educators must 
support young people in developing skills for nonviolent action.
One of the critical thinkers’ primary concerns about critical 
pedagogy, Burbules and Berk (1999) explained, is that it may entail 
indoctrinating students to a particular worldview. “Teaching 
students to think critically must include allowing them to come to 
their own conclusions,” this perspective holds, “yet critical 
pedagogy seems to come dangerously close to prejudging what 
those conclusions must be” (p. 54). A thorough exploration of why 
critical pedagogical approaches sometimes stray into the territory 
of indoctrination is outside the scope of the article. However, I do 
want to point out the approach’s general inattentiveness to practical 
questions of curriculum and instruction (Deng, 2015; M. Young, 
2011, 2013). In the absence of “detailed examinations of what 
actually happens in schools” (Apple, 2015, p. xv)— such as those 
that Hess and McAvoy and other critical thinkers have often 
undertaken— teachers favoring a critical pedagogical orientation 
may have few models for teaching about oppression in ways that do 
not tell students what to think.
From the critical thinking perspective, then, critical 
pedagogues inculcate students with leftist political values (such as 
anticapitalism and opposition to globalization, working- class 
solidarity, green politics, feminism and LGBTQ rights, and 
multiculturalism or antiracism). Insofar as critical pedagogy views 
all social relations through a lens of oppression and domination, 
critical thinkers charge, “everything is up for questioning within 
critical pedagogy except the categories and premises of critical 
pedagogy itself ” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 56). The umbrella 
critique here— what Burbules and Berk (1999) described as “the 
most challenging critique”— is that critical pedagogy fails to 
examine its own ironically hegemonic tendencies. “Critical 
Pedagogy needs to be questioned,” they argued, regarding 
“whether it is simply a more egalitarian and humane way of 
steering students toward certain foregone conclusions” (p. 58).2
Criticality at an Impasse
Despite their differences, critical thinking and critical pedagogy 
share some worthy goals. Both aspire to social transformation, 
as contrasted with the competing educational purpose of 
“transmission” (Stanley, 1992). Those who advocate education 
for transmission aim to prepare young people to participate 
skillfully in society in its current form and, by so doing, to 
reproduce current configurations of institutional and power 
hierarchies. Although transmission- style approaches are among 
the most influential in American citizenship education (see 
Knight Abowitz & Harnish, 2006, on civic republicanism), both 
critical thinking and critical pedagogy reject this model. Instead, 
they aim to use schooling, and democratic citizenship education 
specifically, to transform the social order. They share a desire to 
overcome ignorance and to support young people in making 
decisions based on more accurate understandings of social 
reality than often hold sway in the American political sphere.
And yet, despite their transformative aspirations, Burbules 
and Berk have observed, both critical thinking and critical 
pedagogy have grown ironically uncritical about the most 
significant limitations to their transformative capacity. Each 
viewing the other as “insufficiently critical” (p. 56), both sides have 
become increasingly adamant about their exclusive capacity to 
transform society— whether society appears to be transforming or 
not. Indeed, this ideological amplification has real consequences 
for democratic citizenship education, and the type of society to 
which it contributes. Critical pedagogy may be influential in the 
academy, but it is rare in classrooms (Knight Abowitz & Harnish, 
2006), arguably because of justifiable concerns about political 
indoctrination. On the other hand, critical thinking is commonly 
viewed as a “best practice” approach to democratic citizenship 
education, but its limitations as far as social accountability give 
cause for real concern, as Hess and McAvoy’s Political Classroom 
has recently exemplified.
Democratic Citizenship Education’s  
Social Accountability Problem: 
Limitations of a “Best Practice” Approach
The Political Classroom, I suggest, epitomizes the critical thinking 
approach to democratic citizenship education. Grounded in the 
belief that “schools are, and ought to be, political sites,” the book 
takes a sympathetic look at a challenging paradox for democratic 
citizenship educators. Namely, schools must “provide students 
with a nonpartisan political education” while also preparing them 
“to participate in the actual, highly partisan political community” 
(Hess & McAvoy, 2015, p. 4). To these ends, Hess and McAvoy 
(2015) advocate classroom deliberation of controversial political 
issues and describe the results of an ambitious mixed- method 
longitudinal study of high school social studies courses featuring 
such deliberation. In the three case studies their volume highlights, 
2 See Hytten’s recent (2015) article in Democracy & Education for a 
thoughtful response to such charges.
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students reported an increased “appreciation for the complexity of 
political issues” (p. 53); a greater tendency to discuss politics 
outside of class (p. 55); and an enthusiasm for “being inducted into 
the world of adult discourse” (p. 58). Inasmuch as these dispositions 
are rare among American youth, the authors’ claim about the 
transformative potential of classroom deliberation is sound: These 
are indeed “values that would make a stronger democracy” (p. 7).
The Political Classroom has been widely celebrated (American 
Educational Research Association, 2016; Brighouse, 2015; Lo, 2015; 
Tiflati, 2015), and this response is deserved. In contrast to many 
critical pedagogical volumes on curriculum (e.g., Apple, 2004; Au, 
2012), Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) book investigates day- to- day 
instructional practices in real classrooms. Since the publication of 
Controversy in the Classroom (2009), Hess’s work has given 
classroom teachers (including me) the courage to introduce 
contentious political issues into our classrooms and to open these 
issues to debate. This contribution to democratic citizenship 
education is invaluable. That said, I agree with Wegwert’s (2015) 
recent argument that Hess and McAvoy’s book does not go far 
enough. As Wegwert put it, “the strategies offered in The Political 
Classroom are necessary but not sufficient” for contributing to 
social transformation. My aim, in highlighting The Political 
Classroom’s limitations, is not to pick on this particular volume or 
its authors; in fact, I quite like the book. And yet I worry about 
democratic citizenship educators’ wide agreement that the values 
expressed therein constitute the best of democratic citizenship 
education practice.
The critical thinking characteristics of pluralism, political 
autonomy, and reasonableness are central to The Political Classroom. 
In the remainder of this section, I sketch how the book expresses 
these characteristics and then discuss some limitations by drawing 
on Sanders’s (1997) provocative argument against deliberation. I 
draw on one more student experience reported in Hess and 
McAvoy’s discussion, an anecdote that illustrates the limitations 
Sanders describes. The section that follows proposes an alternative 
approach to citizenship education.
Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) endorsement of classroom 
deliberation aligns with the pluralist perspective that difference is 
an asset to deliberation, rather than an impediment. They argue 
that inviting young people to deliberate authentic political 
controversies increases their awareness of and appreciation for 
diverse perspectives, which is surely true. However, as indicated by 
their too- brief discussion of Amanda’s experience, they do not take 
seriously the real challenges that social inequality poses to their 
pluralist ideals. Amanda’s report that her white classmates told her 
“we don’t want to hear your facts”— a report that seems to challenge 
Hess and McAvoy’s claims about this school’s inclusivity— is left 
almost entirely unexamined.
Similarly, their emphasis on political autonomy has much to 
offer, but autonomy’s limitations remain unexplored. Consider the 
cautionary example of a teacher Hess and McAvoy call Ms. Potter, 
who used a simulation on wealth inequality to advocate her own 
leftist perspectives on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East during 
the Iraq War. The authors rightly point out that such airings of a 
teacher’s opinions “communicate to students that there is one 
view— or one reasonable view— and oversimplify complex political 
issues” (p. 81). In the anecdote of Ms. Potter, and throughout The 
Political Classroom, the authors reiterate how such (arguably 
critical pedagogical) approaches risk indoctrinating students and 
can interfere with political autonomy. And yet, Hess and McAvoy 
pay little attention to the cultural bias that accompanies autonomy’s 
origins in Western liberal humanism or this value’s individualist 
nature (see, e.g., Gaztambide- Fernández, 2012; Knight Abowitz and 
Harnish, 2006). These are valid concerns that need to be taken up.
Finally, like other democratic citizenship educators and 
researchers, Hess and McAvoy (2015) emphasize reasonableness. 
This value appears in The Political Classroom in at least two forms. 
First is in the value placed upon “reasonable views” over 
unreasonable ones. For Hess and McAvoy, a view is unreasonable if 
it violates democratic values such as equality or political 
engagement (p. 76). Because exchanging reasons requires citizens 
to talk and listen to one another respectfully, a second form of 
reasonableness involves what teachers in the study labeled “civil 
discourse.” The authors characterize the distinction between civil 
and uncivil political talk by drawing on students’ own terminology, 
contrasting a “passionate” discussion with one that might “get out 
of hand” (p. 95). And while Hess and McAvoy do take pains to 
emphasize disagreement’s value to deliberation, they do not 
consider that some political issues might evoke intemperate 
disagreements or that some people might be less likely to be 
perceived as reasonable, regardless of what they say or how they say 
it.
In her provocative essay “Against Deliberation,” Sanders (1997) 
argued that deliberation is often counterproductive because “what 
happens when American citizens talk to each other is often neither 
truly deliberative nor really democratic” (p. 349). She observed that 
spelling out standards of respectful discourse such as “address[ing] 
each other as equals” and “offering reasonable, morally justifiable 
arguments”— presumably the kinds of norms established in the 
classrooms Hess and McAvoy described— provides no guarantee 
that such norms will be achieved. “The careful articulation of these 
formal standards,” she wrote, “is a far cry from an assessment of the 
probability of meeting them” (p. 348). Moreover, when facilitators 
do articulate such standards, whether in the context of a teacher 
instructing a class or a judge instructing a jury, she pointed out, this 
can create a false impression that the demands of respectful 
discourse have been addressed, and require no further attention— 
except perhaps in cases of gratuitous, and ostensibly anomalous, 
violations.
Indeed, because some citizens are more likely than others to 
articulate arguments in so- called rational terms, Sanders (1997) 
argued, respectful and inclusive deliberation may appear to be 
proceeding when it is not. In such cases,
we may . . . mistakenly decide that conditions of mutual respect have 
been achieved by deliberators. In this way, taking deliberation as a 
signal of democratic practice paradoxically works undemocratically, 
discrediting on seemingly democratic grounds the views of those who 
are less likely to present their arguments in ways that we recognize as 
characteristically deliberative. (p. 349)
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Sanders went on to explain that, in our political culture, those with 
less experience presenting their arguments in such ways are often 
those “already underrepresented in formal political institutions 
and . . . systematically materially disadvantaged”— including 
women, people of color, and the poor. These people tend not only 
to have less experience making arguments recognizable by others 
as reasonable— “no matter how worthy or true” their 
perspectives— but, because of the insidious and often invisible 
dynamics of prejudice, such people are also less likely to be listened 
to even when their statements conform to the conventions of 
rational discourse (p. 349). Thus, for example, the often thought-
fully articulated and well- supported concerns of Black Lives 
Matter activists have frequently been dismissed as irrational (Jerde, 
2015), uninformed (Lu, 2015), or even racist (Mendoza, 2015). 
Sanders attributed such dismissals to structural and identity- based 
inequalities in what she called “epistemological authority,” or “the 
capacity to evoke acknowledgement of one’s arguments” (p. 349; 
see also I. M. Young, 1996).
This article began by using Amanda’s story to illustrate a 
problem with Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) ostensibly- best- practice 
approach to democratic citizenship education. In another, 
somewhat more elaborated example from the volume, a conserva-
tive Mexican American student named Gabe reported having 
overheard other Republican students saying, “Get out of here,” and, 
“Go back to Mexico,” during the legislative simulation’s delibera-
tion of an immigration bill on the House floor. He responded by 
deciding to share his own experience as an immigrant with the 
assembly, breaking with his own party and advocating for the 
Democrats’ proposed legislation. Afterward, Gabe recalled that his 
classmates “kind of quieted down and they stopped making racial 
slurs . . . I was happy I had made an impact on the way they were 
acting.” He explained that the simulation improved his confidence 
“to stand up and say ‘this is what I see,’” and, for this reason, in Hess 
and McAvoy’s view, the incident supplied a “powerful” opportunity 
for Gabe to learn to speak out against racist views (p. 103). To be 
sure, this was likely an important incident in the development of 
Gabe’s political autonomy.
While I share Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) enthusiasm for 
Gabe’s courage, and for the empowerment he felt as a result, I want 
to suggest that their interpretations of Gabe’s and Amanda’s 
experiences reveal limitations of the deliberative ideal— “from the 
standpoint,” as Burbules and Berk (1999) put it, “of social account-
ability.” Deliberations over affirmative action, in Amanda’s case, and 
immigration, in Gabe’s case, opened doors for dismissive and 
arguably racist attitudes to be aired in the classroom, with no 
evident structures in place to hold the perpetrators, their peers, 
the teachers, or the curriculum accountable. These episodes 
illustrate, in microcosm, one of democracy’s most persistent 
problems: that is, the potential tyranny of a majority. In On 
Liberty, Mill (1859/1956) conceptualized the tyranny of the 
majority by arguing that, in a representative democracy, “society 
can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong 
mandates instead of right . . . it practices a social tyranny more 
formidable than many kinds of political oppression” (p. 4).
While it may be excessive to view the legislative simulation 
that Hess and McAvoy (2015) described as “political oppression,” it 
is, on the other hand, naïve to assume that reasoned deliberation in 
and of itself promotes the safety of its participants. And yet the 
brevity of the book’s discussion of such incidents— together they 
receive about three pages in a volume of more than 200— suggests 
that Hess and McAvoy view them as anomalies, rare eruptions of 
disrespect in a deliberative curriculum built for, and usually 
successful at achieving, inclusivity and respect. The pluralist 
perspective that difference is an asset in deliberation would appear 
to impede, in this case, earnest exploration of the challenges such 
difference may occasion— particularly when students’ experiences 
and status are not merely different, but unequal. Thus, from the 
standpoint of social accountability, Hess and McAvoy’s claims 
about Adams High’s inclusivity underestimate the complexity and 
urgency of creating a truly inclusive classroom.
Amanda’s and Gabe’s experiences at Adams High, in my view, 
bear out Sanders’s (1997) claim about the limitations of delibera-
tion. For Amanda in particular— who was told “we don’t want to 
hear your facts”— it is evident that her capacity to make arguments 
heard, no matter how well- reasoned and thoughtfully- prepared, 
was limited by peers’ perceptions of her epistemological authority. 
Hess and McAvoy (2015) remain silent on the experiences of 
students less adept at conforming to the conventions of rational 
deliberation, or those who had internalized the belief that they 
have no right to speak (I. M. Young, 1996). Rather, in the “best 
practice discussion” classrooms they describe, students’ social 
status is treated as a nonissue. The authors imply that classroom 
deliberation, when well- implemented, is so inclusive as to over-
come all but the most gratuitous incidents of bias and marginaliza-
tion. Amanda’s and Gabe’s experiences suggest otherwise.
The Political Classroom’s widespread warm reception reflects 
critical thinking’s current dominance in democratic citizenship 
education. The field’s enthusiasm for classroom deliberation is 
warranted, yet many citizenship educators favoring the critical 
thinking approach suffer from a dismissive attitude toward the real 
challenges of social inequality. Meanwhile, though critical 
pedagogy offers a robust answer to problems of social accountabil-
ity, Ms. Potter’s story offers an existence proof about the risks of 
indoctrination. For researchers and practitioners who favor critical 
thinking and prioritize political autonomy, these risks make 
critical pedagogy untenable. However, in the absence of the social 
accountability that critical pedagogy might supply, even the best 
scholarly work in the field— which Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) book, 
in my view, exemplifies— offers limited capacity for genuine social 
transformation in service of building a healthier democracy and a 
more just world.
Toward a Transformative Criticality  
for Democratic Citizenship Education
Burbules and Berk (1999) proposed that educational scholars 
interested in rehabilitating criticality must acknowledge the 
limitations of our favored approach, attending generously to what 
other approaches might avail us. They called for an “alternate 
criticality” that embraces the tensions between critical thinking 
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and critical pedagogy, thereby allowing us to “think in new ways” 
(pp. 59- 60). In the balance of this article, I take up Burbules and 
Berk’s call for a different approach to criticality— a criticality that 
accepts the limitations of each approach, makes generative use of 
the tensions between them, and thereby allows us to think 
differently about what transformative schooling requires. I end by 
recommending, as a possible exemplar of this alternative approach, 
Stitzlein’s (2014) volume Teaching for Dissent: Citizenship Education 
and Political Activism.
In response to Burbules and Berk’s (1999) call for an alternate 
version of what it means to be critical, I would like to propose the 
term transformative criticality. This term acknowledges both 
approaches’ shared transformational aspirations and takes up 
Burbules and Berk’s recommendation that we cultivate acceptance 
of the limitations of our favored approach and attend with an open 
mind to the resources other approaches offer. I undertake this work 
in a conciliatory and pragmatist spirit akin to Dewey’s (1902), as 
exemplified in his essay The Child and the Curriculum. Introducing 
his distinction between the supposed unity and spontaneity of the 
child, and the ostensibly stable and orderly logic of the curriculum, 
Dewey observed:
Easier than thinking with surrender of already formed ideas and 
detachment from facts already learned is just to stick by what is 
already said, looking about for something with which to buttress it 
against attack. Thus sects arise: schools of opinion. Each selects that set 
of conditions that appeals to it; and then erects them into a complete 
and independent truth, instead of treating them as a factor in a 
problem, needing adjustment. (p. 182)
The concept of transformative criticality I articulate aims to follow 
Dewey’s example: It treats the competing characteristics of critical 
thinking and critical pedagogy as factors in need of adjustment, in 
order more effectively to address the problem of schooling for 
social transformation.
In democratic citizenship education, a transformative 
criticality acknowledges the damage social inequality inflicts on the 
deliberative ideal and supports young people in drawing informed 
conclusions about how social problems— perhaps most important, 
inequality itself— ought to be addressed. This section proposes 
some key characteristics of a transformative criticality for 
democratic citizenship education. These include Apple’s (2014) 
concept of decentered unities as a way of conceptualizing who is 
involved; a strategy that answers Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004) 
call for both participatory and justice- oriented citizenship education; 
and a few thoughts of my own, inspired by a pragmatist 
philosophical tradition, regarding cultivating a disposition of 
wholeheartedness in democratic citizenship education.
Despite his well- known critical pedagogical allegiances, Apple 
crossed the aisle, as it were, to publish The Political Classroom in the 
Critical Social Thought series he edits for Routledge. His notion of 
“decentered unities” draws on both the critical thinkers’ pluralist 
values, and the critical pedagogues’ emphasis on solidarity. 
Decentered unities, Apple (2014) has explained, are areas of 
“common ground” among diverse groups, whereby “joint struggles 
can be engaged in ways that do not subsume each group under the 
leadership of only one understanding” (p. 13). Such coalitions share 
critical thinkers’ emphasis on difference, and critical pedagogues’ 
emphasis on solidarity. As Apple put it, “a richer and more diverse 
‘we’ can be built based not on false and romantic notions that we 
can all share in each other’s pain, but on a recognition that alliances 
when possible are crucial to strategies of interruption” (p. 94). 
Embracing decentered unities may encourage us to appeal more 
widely to others, including to those who may not appear to be 
natural allies (for example, consider the so- called Cowboy and 
Indian Alliance, whereby indigenous groups and nonindigenous 
ranchers banded together to oppose the Keystone XL pipeline). 
With practical emphasis on building coalitions to interrupt 
problematic social phenomena— and without necessarily specify-
ing what kind of phenomena ought to be interrupted— decentered 
unities are useful in developing a transformative approach to 
criticality.
In their influential empirical study of citizenship education 
programs in the United States, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) 
identified three common approaches. The first, “personally 
responsible citizenship,” emphasizes volunteerism and obedience 
and enacts a model of social transmission rather than social 
transformation. The authors rejected this model due to its message 
that “citizenship does not require democratic governments, 
politics, or even collective endeavors” (p. 244). Two other models, 
Table 1. Three Approaches to Criticality
Critical Thinking Critical Pedagogy Transformative Criticality
Actors Pluralism: individual and group 
difference as an asset to deliberation
Political Solidarity: the majority 
embrace the minority’s cause
“Decentered Unities”: areas of 
common ground not reducible  
to one understanding
Strategies Political Autonomy: cultivating 
individual capacity to make un- 
coerced decisions
Social Justice Activism: cultivating 
collective capacity to build and take 
part in social movements
Participatory + Justice- Oriented 
Citizenship: cultivating both engage-
ment and dissent
Dispositions Reasonableness: civilly seeking an 
outcome to which deliberators are 
willing to consent
Critique: cultivating attitudes of 
urgency and outrage in the face of 
oppression
Wholeheartedness: acknowledging 
suffering and cultivating pragmatic 
hopefulness
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however, were described more favorably. “Participatory citizen-
ship” emphasizes training students to engage with government and 
community organizations and to “develop strategies for accom-
plishing collective tasks,” while “justice- oriented citizenship” 
teaches young people to “question, debate, and change established 
systems and structures that reproduce patterns of injustice over 
time” (p. 240). If educators aim to support students in developing 
capacities “for critical analysis and social change” as well as 
“committed civic act[ion]” (p. 245), Westheimer and Kahne 
argued, they must “give explicit attention to both.” I propose that 
models of democratic citizenship education emphasizing both 
collective action and deliberation might increase the discipline’s 
capacity to contribute to social transformation. The increasingly 
popular method of action civics (Gingold, 2013; Levinson, 2012; 
Millenson, Mills, & Andes, 2014) is a promising example.3
Finally, I want to propose the concept of wholeheartedness as a 
possible characteristic of transformative criticality for democratic 
citizenship education. Where the critical thinkers tend to favor 
reasonableness, with its emphasis on the dispassionate cultivation 
of liberal democratic values, and the critical pedagogues tend to 
favor critique, with its emphasis on the fervent communication of 
moral urgency, a transformative criticality attends wholeheartedly 
to the possibility that some contexts call for level- headedness and 
measured deliberation, while others require impassioned outcry. 
Wholeheartedness arises from humans’ essential impulse to 
care— to live, as Purpel (1989) has put it, “a coherent life of ultimate 
meaning . . . that is right, just, and loving” (p. 30). It does not shy 
away from the difficult but rather attends with courage and 
compassion to the brute realities of pain, suffering, and injustice in 
the world, and cultivates commitment to addressing them. 
Wholeheartedness acknowledges and contends with grief, outrage, 
and despair, but also cultivates habits of pragmatic hope, which in 
turn allow agency to develop (Shade, 2001). And wholeheartedness 
engages thoughtfully, deliberately, and in good faith with the 
available evidence, listening generously to those perspectives that 
contradict our own views.
The term “wholeheartedness” may resonate with readers 
familiar with Dewey’s (1916/2008) three attitudes necessary for 
reflective thinking: open- mindedness, responsibility, and 
wholeheartedness.4 My proposed use here expands upon Dewey’s 
conception. For Dewey, wholeheartedness— or what he later 
termed “simple- mindedness” or “directness”— indicated a unity of 
3 As Levinson (2014) explained, action civics engages students in 
examining their community, choosing a pressing issue, researching the 
issue and setting a goal, analyzing power dynamics in the situation, 
developing strategies for addressing the problem, and taking action to 
address policy (p. 68). Action civics has great potential to support young 
people in learning to translate voice into influence, and thus to contrib-
ute to transforming the social order.
4 Tracking the concept of wholeheartedness through Dewey’s work 
presents a challenge, since he changed the label he applied to this con-
cept between the 1910 edition of How We Think and a later discussion of 
reflective thinking in 1916’s Democracy and Education, then dropped the 
concept completely from the 1933 edition of How We Think. In tracing 
this evolution, I am indebted to Rodgers (2002) for a useful bibliographic 
footnote (p. 865, n. 4).
attention and purpose and the absence of distraction or half- 
hearted commitments. “Absorption, engrossment, full concern 
with subject matter for its own sake, nurture it,” he wrote. 
“Divided interest and evasion destroy it” (p. 183). While my own 
approach to wholeheartedness does require fullness of intellectual 
commitment, I am more interested in the “heart” portion of the 
term than Dewey seems to have been. Wholeheartedness, as I use 
it, calls for caring, in two senses of the word. That is, wholeheart-
edness entails caring as compassionate interdependence, in the 
sense that we take care of one another (Hytten, 2015; Noddings, 
2002); and it entails caring as unwavering commitment, in the 
sense that we care deeply about the outcomes of our efforts toward 
social transformation. When exercising caring, then, we reject 
classroom approaches that harm any persons whatsoever, as well 
as any approaches that pay lip service to social transformation 
while reproducing the status quo.
I want to acknowledge that each of these three proposed 
characteristics of a transformative criticality is challenging to 
implement. In a profession beset by ever- accumulating and often 
contradictory demands, a democratic citizenship education that 
engages diverse groups in a joint struggle for social transformation, 
supports young people in engaging in deliberation and collective 
action, and cultivates a wholehearted engagement with the 
uplifting and the difficult alike is an enormous undertaking. “We 
must remember why it is so difficult” to make moral commitments, 
Purpel (1999) has reminded us. “We must have compassion for 
each other and accept as part of our assumption that the matter of 
making such commitments is of great significance to each of us and 
that it is very likely that many of us have struggled mightily with 
this issue” (p. 58). Democratic citizenship educators interested in 
increasing our capacity to contribute to social transformation 
ought to hold ourselves accountable to this goal, but we need also 
to have compassion for ourselves on the path.
Teaching for Dissent: An Exemplar  
of Transformative Criticality
Stitzlein’s (2014) Teaching for Dissent favors neither exclusively 
the critical thinking approach (with its inattention to social 
inequality) nor the critical pedagogical approach (with its risk of 
political indoctrination). Rather, I argue that Stitzlein’s book 
expresses all three characteristics of transformative criticality, 
drawing from the best of both critical thinking and critical 
pedagogy without taking sides. Teaching for Dissent, Stitzlein 
explains from the outset, is grounded in the idea that “good 
dissent is key to the maintenance and improvement of democ-
racy,” because dissent enables divergent voices to be heard and 
contributes to the legitimacy of the government. She calls 
attention to a recent upsurge in dissent in contemporary Amer-
ica, from the Occupy Movement to the Tea Party, representing 
polarization not as a problem but as evidence of dissent’s poten-
tial to transform society. Thus, she suggests that we aim to 
“maximize this historic moment of dissent in our streets” (p. 3) in 
service of building a democracy “where competing visions of 
good living are exchanged” (p. 8). To contribute to this 
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transformative aim, she argues, schools should support young 
people in developing the skills and dispositions necessary for 
dissent.
Teaching for Dissent enacts a version of transformative 
criticality in that it endorses both critical thinking and critical 
pedagogical perspectives while sidestepping the pitfalls of both. 
That is, it attends in an engaged and elaborated way to the 
challenges of social inequality, while refraining from steering 
readers toward predetermined conclusions. Along the way, the 
volume expresses (to varying extents) the concept of “decentered 
unities” as a way of conceptualizing who is involved; a strategy both 
participatory and justice- oriented; and a disposition toward 
wholeheartedness. Thus, its approach to democratic citizenship 
education may contain greater potential to contribute to 
transforming the social order than do the critical thinkers’ or 
critical pedagogues’ approaches in isolation.
Of the three characteristics of a transformative criticality I 
have proposed, cultivating decentered unities is least developed in 
Teaching for Dissent. That said, the volume does express faith in 
diverse groups’ potential to find common ground. Stitzlein’s (2014) 
emphasis on “dissent within the process of consensus- building”  
(p. 12) resembles the pluralists’ belief in difference as an asset to 
deliberation more than it resembles Apple’s (2014) argument that 
“alliances when possible are crucial to strategies of interruption” 
(p. 94). On the other hand, a lengthy bipartisan appeal in the 
opening pages demonstrates sincere belief in the value of coalition 
building among unlikely allies. Arguing that “issues of dissent are 
central to both parties . . . within the larger picture of a successfully 
flourishing democracy” (p. 3), Stitzlein suggests that liberals and 
conservatives alike aim to interrupt the status quo: Despite 
aspirations to conserve the past, Stitzlein points out, the Right— 
like the Left— uses dissent to propose new alternatives. And both 
parties assert “deep commitments to individual liberties,” albeit 
for different ends. To the extent that dissent “marries the best of 
both parties and is feasible in today’s world” without specifying 
specific political or ideological aims (Stitzlein, 2014, p. 4), it offers 
an opportunity to build what Apple (2014) has called “a richer and 
more diverse ‘we’” (p. 94).
Teaching for Dissent endorses both participatory and justice- 
oriented approaches to citizenship education. Westheimer and 
Kahne’s (2004) “participatory citizenship,” recall, emphasized 
training students to engage with government and community 
organizations and to “develop strategies for accomplishing 
collective tasks,” while “justice- oriented citizenship” teaches young 
people to “question, debate, and change established systems and 
structures that reproduce patterns of injustice over time” (p. 240). 
Democratic citizenship educators interested in social 
transformation, they argued, must engage young people in both 
approaches. Stitzlein (2014) advocates such a model when she urges 
educators to provide opportunities for young people to “bring 
children out to politically and civically active groups,” and to work 
“alongside real people engaged in struggle, doing what Giroux 
called ‘making the political more pedagogical’” (p. 176). Insofar as it 
emphasizes “struggle,” this approach is more than participatory, 
and insofar as it prioritizes engaging in authentic political 
decision- making processes, it exceeds the characteristics of 
justice- oriented citizenship as Westheimer and Kahne described it. 
For Stitzlein, young people must learn both how to exercise voice in 
political institutions, and how to dissent against them when 
necessary.
Of the three characteristics of transformative criticality I have 
proposed, wholeheartedness is Teaching for Dissent’s clear strong 
suit. Wholeheartedness, I have suggested, entails ability to 
distinguish between situations that call for measured deliberation, 
and situations that call for impassioned response. In keeping with 
this approach, Stitzlein (2014) calls attention to the place in dissent 
for both “rational argument and rhetoric” and “emotions and 
embodied experience.” Reasoned deliberation and the inclusion of 
multiple perspectives are essential to dissent, Stitzlein argues, 
endorsing the pluralist viewpoint that “we need to celebrate and 
legitimize conflict and disagreement not just as facts of life, but 
sources of better living” (p. 72). At the same time, “other techniques 
of dissent” are equally necessary. These may include the expression of 
powerful emotions such as frustration and anger, which have the 
capacity to “alert dissenters to problems” and “mobilize comrades 
and persuade opponents” (p. 61). These may also include the 
intemperate strategies of “mobilization, protest, and disruption” 
and may “require [the] remedial work” of securing access for 
oppressed peoples before deliberation can take place (pp. 73– 74, 
quoting Levine & Nierras, 2007, p. 36).
As these strategies may suggest, wholeheartedness in 
democratic citizenship education does not avoid the difficult, but 
rather attends with courage and compassion to pain, suffering, and 
injustice and cultivates commitment to addressing them. In 
Teaching for Dissent, these qualities of wholeheartedness arise in 
Stitzlein’s (2014) discussions of despair and of hope. In a rare move 
for democratic citizenship educators favoring either the critical 
thinking or critical pedagogical approach, Stitzlein argues that 
students “should discuss the impact of despair.” They should turn 
toward and acknowledge their own and others’ suffering “and 
brainstorm ways to persist through it . . . It is important that 
children recognize their own closeness to, participation in, or 
complicity with atrocity and despair in order to move from passive 
listener . . . to active agent,” Stitzlein argues (p. 163). But she does not 
stop at the despair that sometimes characterizes critical pedagogi-
cal critique. Instead, she advocates cultivating hope among 
dissenters.
In her chapter on hope (coauthored with Nolan), Stitzlein 
(2014) argues that good dissenters must cultivate a disposition of 
hopefulness that “is located within and grows out of the muddle 
and complex circumstances of everyday life” (p. 150). This pragma-
tist conception of hope is not starry- eyed or unrealistic, but rather 
“resides in a world that is both horrendous and joyful” (p. 152). 
Amidst messy and often difficult realities, young dissenters learn 
neither to give up in despair nor to take refuge in fantasies and 
delusions. Instead, they learn to practice the clear- eyed posing of 
alternatives. Good dissent, then, marshals a “language of possibil-
ity,” in which “hope becomes anticipatory rather than messianic, 
mobilizing rather than therapeutic’” (p. 148, quoting Giroux, 2006, 
p. 37). Such a wholehearted approach to democratic citizenship 
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calls for enormous courage and resourcefulness, from teachers and 
students alike. Stitzlein makes clear that teaching for dissent 
requires nothing less.
With its faith in dissent to engender decentered unities across 
partisan lines, its endorsement of a simultaneously participatory 
and justice- oriented democratic citizenship curriculum, and its 
wholehearted and pragmatic hopefulness, Teaching for Dissent 
offers democratic citizenship educators a useful model of what 
transformative criticality might look like. Stitzlein takes seriously 
both the critical pedagogues’ call to social accountability and the 
critical thinkers’ call to allow citizens to determine for themselves 
what a just and equitable society consists of. By so doing, she 
models an approach to criticality which offers democratic 
citizenship education an enlarged capacity to contribute to social 
transformation.
Conclusion
Because of the two approaches’ unwillingness to accept their own 
limitations, I have argued that neither critical pedagogy nor critical 
thinking is presently in a good position to contribute to democratic 
citizenship education’s efforts to transform the social order. Rather 
than fortifying their positions, I suggest, each side would do well to 
listen generously to rivals’ critiques. This does not mean that we 
ought to abandon our loyalties, however. At the outset of this 
article, I revealed my own critical pedagogical affinity, and despite 
its limitations, in my view, critical pedagogy’s transformative 
possibilities outweigh its shortcomings. That said, I take seriously 
Burbules and Berk’s (1999) charge that scholars of all stripes ought 
to attend and respond to the most difficult challenges to our points 
of view.
By suggesting the term transformative criticality and 
proposing some defining characteristics in the form of decentered 
unities, participatory and justice- oriented citizenship, and 
wholeheartedness, I gesture to a possible path out of the the 
impasse Burbules and Berk (1999) described. By so doing, I hope to 
avail critical pedagogical scholars like myself, and critical thinkers 
too, of a set of criteria for enlarging our work’s transformative 
capacities.
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